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I. Introduction
The following is an update on Louisiana’s legislative activity and case
law relating to oil and gas, and mineral law from August 1, 2015 to July 1,
2016.
II. Case Law
A. Local Government Ordinances
In 2014, the Commissioner of the Office of Conservation of the State of
Louisiana approved a drilling unit to be located in a residential area
designated as the “A-3 Suburban District” in St. Tammany Parish. 1
Previously in 2007, St. Tammany Parish had adopted the St. Tammany
Parish Unified Development Code, and in 2010, Ordinance No. 10-2408
was passed that rezoned unincorporated areas of the parish. 2 The property
in question fell within that zoned area and had been used as a tree farm for
the last thirty years with no structures within a mile radius of the proposed
well site. 3 The Parish filed suit against the Commissioner alleging that the
zoning designation made drilling illegal. 4
The trial court ruled in favor of Helis Oil finding that La. R.S. 30:28F
preempted any local zoning ordinance insofar as it applies to oil and gas
activity. 5 The state law in question specifically prohibited other
1. St. Tammany Parish Gov’t v. Welch, 2015-1152, 2016 WL 918361, at *1 (La. App.
1 Cir. 3/9/2016).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *2.
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governmental agencies from interfering with drilling in the exploration of
minerals. 6 The appellate court looked to the Louisiana Constitution, which
stated that the legislature may enact laws regarding natural resources in
ways that protect the health and safety of its citizens. 7 As a result, the
legislature has enacted laws that extensively regulate oil and gas
exploration and has created the Office of Conservation to be responsible for
that regulation. 8
St. Tammany Parish argued that Article VI of the Louisiana Constitution
allowed local governments to designate land for specific purposes and that
the La. R.S. 30:28F did not preempt their authority to do so. 9 The appellate
court found that a state law will preempt local law when it is the “clear and
manifest purpose of the legislature to do so.” 10 Unless expressly forbidden,
local government’s law will prevail. La. R.S. 30:28F specifically prohibits
another political agency from interfering with drilling. 11 The court also
stated that because the legislature has created an extensive regulation of
drilling, to allow conflict could possibly be dangerous. 12 The Court went on
to state that the Commissioner of Conservation’s powers are police powers
and cannot be undermined. 13 Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the
grant of summary judgment in favor of Helis Oil. 14
B. Depth Limitation Language
At issue in BRP LLC v. MC Louisiana Minerals LLC was depth
limitation language contained in an assignment from International Paper
Company (“IP”) to Chesapeake Royalty, LLC (“Chesapeake”). 15 IP owned
land in Louisiana and sought to sell the mineral holdings in that land.
Chesapeake approached IP to buy those interests and entered into a letter of
intent to purchase with IP on June 30, 2008. 16 On July 24, 2008, the
purchase and sale agreement was finalized, in which the assets sold were
defined as:
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at *5.
15. BRP LLC v. Louisiana Minerals LLC, 50,549-CA, 2016 WL 2903566, at *1 (La.
App. 2d Cir. May 18, 2016).
16. Id.
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[A]ll of Sellers’ right, title and interest in and to (a) the oil, gas
and other minerals in, to and under the land described in the
attached Exhibit A, and any and all oil and gas leases covering
such lands, INSOFAR AND ONLY INSOFAR as such oil, gas
and other minerals are located below that depth which is the
stratigraphic equivalent of the base of the Cotton Valley
Formation and the top of the Louark Group defined as
correlative to a depth of 10,765’ in the Winchester Samuels 23
#1 well (API #1703124064) located in Section 23-14N-13W,
DeSoto Parish, LA, and correlative to a depth of 9,298’ in the
Tenneco Baker #1 well (API #1701320382) located in Section
12-16N-10W, Bienville Parish, LA… 17
IP then assigned its interests to BRP, LLC (“BRP”), who argued that IP
had only intended to sell rights in the Haynesville Shale and lower depths to
Chesapeake. 18 BRP maintained that IP retained the interests above the top
of the Louark Group, which contained the Haynesville Shale. 19 Chesapeake
believes that it owned rights in the Haynesville Shale and the Bossier
Shale. 20 Both BRP and Chesapeake filed for summary judgment arguing
that the language contained in the purchase and sale agreement was
unambiguous. 21
According to David Liebtreu, the vice-president of IP, Chesapeake and
IP only spoke of assigning rights to the Haynesville Shale. 22 However,
according to the letter of intent between IP and Chesapeake, Chesapeake
offered to buy rights below the Cotton Valley Formation, which Liebtreu
believed only included the Haynesville Shale. 23 According to geology
experts for BRP, the language contained in the agreement identified four
different horizons that did not correlate to one another. 24 One expert for
BRP stated that the Bossier Shale was sometimes contained within the
Louark Group. 25 According to another expert for BRP, the base of the
Cotton Valley Formation and the top of the Louark Group formation were
separated by the Bossier Shale, with the Bossier Shale being part of the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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Cotton Valley Group and the Haynesville Shale being a part of the Louark
Group. 26
John Sharp, a geoscience manager for Chesapeake, stated that the
Bossier Shale was below the Cotton Valley Formation and above the
Haynesville Formation and that in certain areas of Louisiana, the Bossier
Formation falls into the Cotton Valley Group and in other areas, is in the
Louark Group. 27 According to an expert for Chesapeake, he believed that
the wells correlated and that the Bossier Shale would fall below the horizon
created by the depth limitation language in the agreement. 28 The trial court
agreed with Chesapeake that the language was not ambiguous and that the
intent of IP was to retain its interest in the Cotton Valley Formation. 29 The
court found that the wells referenced in the description should be given
consideration and found that those wells were located in the middle of the
Bossier Shale Formation. 30 The court also found that the well descriptions
would include the Bossier C, which was the producing part of the Bossier
Formation. 31
BRP appealed the judgment and argued that the language contained in
the purchase and sale agreement was ambiguous, and as such, the correct
interpretation would be that IP conveyed all interest in the minerals below
the lowest depth listed, which is the top of the Louark Group. 32 BRP
maintained that the description was ambiguous as the base of the Cotton
Valley Formation and top of the Louark Group were two different lines,
separated by the Bossier Shale. 33 The appellate court found that IP was only
concerned with reserving the rights in the Cotton Valley Formation and
affirmed the trial court’s decision. 34
C. Offers to Purchase Mineral Rights and Fraud
The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked to review a case wherein the
plaintiffs, owners of a one-eighth royalty interest, brought suit against
Evolution Petroleum Corporation (“Evolution”), the Lessees, seeking
damages and rescission of a sale of their royalty interest, alleging fraud on
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *12.
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Evolution’s part. 35 Evolution entered into a purchase agreement with
Denbury Resources, LLC (“Denbury”), in which Denbury would use CO2
enhanced oil recovery technology that would increase productivity in its
wells. 36 Denbury believed that by using the CO2 technology, it could
increase production from 145 barrels per day to potentially 30 to 40 million
barrels. 37 Evolution then made offers to purchase the plaintiffs’ royalty
interest offering an amount equal to sixteen years of previous royalties,
totaling $41,773. 38 The plaintiffs believed that they were preyed upon by
Evolution as they were elderly and not familiar with oil and gas matters. 39
They argued that there was a “relation of confidence” between the operators
of the past and themselves, which led them to rely on Evolution’s
statements and omissions, which amounted to fraud. 40
The district court and appellate court found that there was no cause of
action; however, the appellate court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their
petition and found that “the lessee’s duty to act as a reasonably prudent
operator for the parties’ mutual benefit might require disclosure of the
Denbury deal,” which in turn would be a cause of action for fraud and fraud
by silence. 41 The plaintiffs relied on Mineral Code art. 122, which stated
that a lessee does not have a fiduciary obligation to the lessor, but must
operate as a reasonably prudent operate to mutually benefit both himself
and the lessor. 42 What constitutes a reasonably prudent operator may be
stipulated. 43
The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court that the language
contained in the statute created a cause of action for fraud by silence. 44 The
plaintiffs argued that a duty arose for Evolution to disclose information
about the sale to Denbury and recovery of reserves through operating the
property. 45 The Court found that Article 122 did not impose a duty to
disclose information about that type of transaction, but rather imposed four
obligations: an obligation to develop known formations, an obligation to
explore and test all of the leased premises after discovering minerals in
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

McCarthy v. Evolution Petroleum Corp., 180 So. 3d 252, 254 (La. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 254-55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 259.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss3/8

2016]

Louisiana

197

paying quantities, an obligation to protect the leased property from
drainage, and an obligation to produce and market those minerals. 46 The
Supreme Court stated that Article 122 dealt with the obligation of the lessee
to develop a field, and not with the purchasing and selling of mineral
assets. 47
The Supreme Court also disagreed with the appellate court’s finding for
a cause of action for fraud. 48 The appellate court found that Evolution had
distracted the plaintiffs by using the assessment value on past production
and that Evolution knew the minerals were more valuable than what they
offered. 49 The Supreme Court found that Article 17 of the Mineral Code
prohibited rescission of a sale of a mineral right for lesion beyond moiety,
which occurs when the agreed upon price is less than one half of the actual
value of an immovable. 50 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court’s finding of a cause of action for fraud and fraud by
silence. 51
D. Production in Paying Quantities
In the early 1980s, three identical mineral leases were taken from Eva
Mae Whorton, Henry Whorton, Wade Whorton, Hattie Flem, and others,
covering 300 acres of land, which provided for a three-year primary term
and a secondary term that called for “production of minerals or additional
operations to maintain the leases beyond their primary term.” 52 In 1983, the
Louisiana Office of Conservation established a 480-acre unit, of which the
Whorton leases contributed thirty acres. 53A well was drilled within the unit,
but was not located on the Whorton’s 300-acre tract. 54 The leases in
question contained no Pugh clause and were maintained as to the entire 300
acres. 55 In 2011, the well stopped producing and was subsequently plugged
in 2013. 56

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
2016).
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. at 261, 264.
.Id. at 265.
Middleton v. EP Energy E & P Co., 188 So. 3d 263, 264 reh’g denied (2d Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The current lessors asserted that the Whorton leases terminated for
failing to produce in paying quantities and demanded a release of the lease
from the working interest owners, which the defendants denied. 57 As
evidence, they asserted that between January 1990 and January 1994, the
well produced no more than 1,000 MCF of natural gas and less than 100
barrels of oil. 58 The plaintiffs asked for a partial summary judgment
terminating those leases. The trial court found that “operating a well at or a
minimal profit for forty-one months is not sufficient to induce a reasonably
prudent operator to continue production,” and ruled in the plaintiffs favor,
ordering the leases had terminated on December 1, 1994. 59
The defendants asserted that in determining whether a well is producing
in paying quantities, the court should take into account the production that
occurred seventeen years after the period of alleged disruption of
production. The defendants then argued that a reasonably prudent operator
would continue to develop the well, despite the forty-one month reprieve. 60
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that in determining paying
quantities, the court must take into account all factors that would influence
a reasonable and prudent operator, including reservoir depletion, market
price, relative profitability of other surrounding wells, operating costs, and
net profit. 61 The test is whether there is “a reasonable basis for the
expectation of profitable returns from the well.” 62 The defendants produced
evidence showing that the well expenses at the time of the slow period of
production were extraordinary and nonrecurring expenses, which are not
considered operating expenses in the determination of producing in paying
quantities. 63 The appellate court found that there was a question of material
fact as to whether or not a reasonably prudent operator would continue to
operate that well and reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs that
terminated the mineral leases in 1994 and remanded the issue to the district
court. 64

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 265.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 266.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 267-68.
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E. Conveyance Language
At issue in Keystone Energy Co. v. Denbury Onshore, LLC, is whether a
1904 notarial act conveyed a right of way or a fee interest in a 6.29 acre
tract. 65 In 1904, Southwestern Rice and Canal Company conveyed an
interest to Louisiana Western Railroad Company, pursuant to a notarial act,
in 6.29 acres, which at the time of the conveyance, was located in Calcasieu
Parish. 66 A typed copy of the instrument was filed in Calcasieu Parish and
Jefferson Davis Parish, a county that was later carved out of Calcasieu
Parish. 67 A handwritten copy of the instrument also existed and was later
recorded in Jefferson Davis Parish in 2010. 68 The handwritten and typed
copies of the documents are similar in all regards, except that the typed
versions contain a caption at the top of the document that states “Right of
Way.” 69 The term “Right of Way” does not appear in the handwritten
version or anywhere in the body of both versions of the documents. 70
In 1999, Union Pacific, the successor of Louisiana Western Railroad
Company, conveyed the property to the Dabovals in a quitclaim deed,
reserving the minerals under the property. 71 Union Pacific and Keystone
entered into a lease covering the 6.29 acre tract, which was recorded in
2010. 72 The Dabovals also executed a lease with Suncoast Land Services,
Inc., recorded in 2004. 73 Suncoast then assigned the lease to Denbury and
Hilcorp. 74 Denbury spudded a well on the subject property in 2005. 75
Denbury and Hilcorp argued that Southwestern Rice intended to grant a
right of way, and not an interest in fee to Louisiana Western Railroad
Company, and accordingly, the Dabovals acquired the property through
prescription. 76 The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
Keystone, finding that the 1904 instrument transferred title in fee and did
not convey a mere right of way. 77
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

188 So. 3d 458 (3d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 460.
Id. at 461.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 464.
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The Second Court of Appeals found that there was conflicting evidence
as to whether the 1904 instrument conveyed a fee interest or a right of way.
The recitals in the document stated that the purpose of the conveyance was
to allow for a railroad to “pass through” Southwestern’s land and “give an
enhanced value to its Lands,” which shall be considered partial
consideration. 78 Due to the ambiguity in the language of the conveyance,
the court considered extrinsic evidence, which included conveyances
between the parties on the same date, a 2004 correspondence in which
Union Pacific suggested they only had a right of way, and inconclusive
evidence as to whether Southwestern or Louisiana Western Railroad
Company were assed for property taxes. 79 As a result, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court’s partial summary judgment and remanded the issue
to the lower court. 80
F. The Perpetual Nature of the Habendum Clause
In Regions Bank v. Questar Exploration & Production Corp., mineral
rights owners sued Exxon Mobil Company, the current owners of the three
oil and gas leases, for failure to reasonably develop the leases. 81 The
plaintiffs filed suit declaring that the 1907 leases had terminated by
operation of law pursuant to La. C.C. art 2679, which provides that a lease
may not exceed ninety-nine years. 82 The trial court found that La. C.C. art
2679 did not apply to mineral leases. 83
The leases provided for a primary term of ten years and continued “as
much longer thereafter as gas or oil is found or produced in paying
quantities.” 84 There were several hundred wells drilled pursuant to those
leases; however, the mineral rights owners wanted a cancellation and
release of the leases as to depths below six thousand feet alleging that the
defendants did not reasonably develop the leases as to deeper depths. 85 The
owners later amended their petition and stated that the leases were
terminated by operation of a Louisiana statute that states that leases may not
exceed ninety-nine years. 86
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 466–67.
Id. at 468.
Id.
184 So. 3d 260, 263, reh’g denied (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
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The mineral owners appealed lower court’s ruling. The appellate court
affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that the leases were not
perpetual, but rather were governed by the terms of the Louisiana Mineral
Code, La. R. S. 31:115, which provided for a maximum secondary term
based upon continuous drilling or operations or production. 87 The court
further found that Article 2679 of the Civil Code, which provides for a
maximum lease term of ninety-nine years, does not apply to mineral leases
because mineral leases are governed by the maximum term provided in the
Mineral Code. 88 As such, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s
judgment in favor of the defendants. 89
G. Use of Lift Gas
Red Willow Offshore, L.L.C. and Medco Energy US, L.L.C. were coworking interest owners in a natural gas well. 90 Not possessing the means to
process the gas produced, they partnered with Palm Energy Offshore,
L.L.C. (“Palm”), which had a production processing facility located
approximately four miles away from the well. 91 They entered into a
Production Processing Agreement (“PPA”) in which Palm would allocate
the gas volume to Red Willow and Medco based on a meter reading of the
amount of gas that left the Palm processing facility and entered into the
Tennessee Gas Sales Pipeline. 92 Red Willow and Medco hired an auditing
firm to audit the gas allocations. 93 The auditing firm found that Palm was
diverting a percentage of the gas allocation as “lift gas” to help Palm’s lowpressure wells, which resulted in a financial loss of $1,163,587.90. 94 The
trial court ruled in favor of the Red Willow and Medco finding that Palm
breached the PPA, which Palm then appealed. 95
The appellate court found that the PPA was silent on the use of
processed gas as lift gas. 96 The court found that the purpose of the PPA was
to take the gas, process it, and deliver it for sale, and that the use of lift gas

87. Id. at 264-65.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Red Willow Offshore, LLC v. Palm Energy Offshore LLC, 185 So. 3d 293, reh’g
denied (4th Cir. 2016).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 295-96.
95. Id. at 296.
96. Id. at 298.
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was an operational function, and not a processing function. 97 The court
cited to the American Petroleum Institute Manual, Section 6.2 and
Statewide Order No. 29-D-1, which adopted the API manual, that states that
“[m]ethods to account for fuel gas, lift gas, flare gas, and the like must be
included in the design of an allocation program” and that once a number is
adjusted for the lift gas, then a sales value may be found. 98 The court also
cited the Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies’ (“COPAS”) Gas
Accounting Manual, which stated that lift gas can be purchased or
transferred from other sources, but those sources are to be paid for the use
of the gas, evidencing that lift gas is usually accounted for and allocated to
producers for the value of that gas. 99 The Fourth Circuit affirmed that trial
court’s judgment that Palm’s use of the gas as lift gas was a breach of the
PPA. 100
H. Lease Division
In Guy v. Empress, L.L.C., the owners of a 140 acre-tract sought the
release of the shallow rights of an oil and gas lease. 101 The lease contained a
continuous drilling clause, a vertical Pugh clause, a horizontal Pugh clause,
and an assignment clause. 102 The Lessors claimed that the lease was
“horizontally divided” by an assignment in which the lessee, Long
Petroleum, L.L.C. assigned to Empress, L.L.C., all right, title, and interest
in depths from the surface to the base of the Cotton Valley formation. 103
Long spudded a well, the Edwards No. 1, in the shallow depths before the
expiration of the primary term. Empress spudded a well, the Yarbrough No.
1, after the expiration of the primary term. 104
The lessors claimed that the deep rights assignment divided the lease into
two independent leases and that because the well drilled in the deep rights
was commenced after the expiration of the primary term, the lease had
expired as to the deep rights. 105 Further, they argued that the lease also
expired as to the shallow rights because the lessees did not engage in
operations for the drilling, completion or reworking of a well ninety days
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 299.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 303.
193 So. 3d 177, reh’g denied (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 178–79.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 179–80.
Id. at 181.
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after the Edwards No. 1 was shut in on December 31, 2011, pursuant to the
continuous drilling operations clause. 106
The district court found that the working interest owners developed the
premises according to the terms of the lease and that the question of
whether the assignment created a sublease was immaterial. 107 The Second
Court of Appeals found that the lease was not divided by the assignment of
the deep rights, citing the Mineral Code, which allows for the transfer of
interest by assignment unless the lease specifically prohibits the
assignment. 108 Further, they found that the Lessees had complied with the
continuous drilling clause in the lease. The Yarbrough No. 1 was spudded
within the ninety-day period allotted by the continuous drilling clause. 109
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. 110
I. Tax Deed Property Descriptions
In 1929, the heirs of A. V. Loftus came into possession of a 117-acre
tract of land described as being the “North half of the Northeast Quarter,
and the Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter, Section 8, Township 14
N, Range 13 W; less three acres.” 111 The tax assessment for the property
described the tract as the “N ½ NE, Sec 8, SW NE Sec 8 Less 3 a . . . .” 112
In 1939, after failing to pay taxes, the State of Louisiana sold the property
and reserved the mineral interest. 113 The tax adjudication deed described the
property as “N ½ of NE 1/4 (less three acres in SW Corner) and SE 1/4 of
NE 1/4 of Sec 8…”. 114 The State executed several oil and gas leases
covering this property. Subsequently, numerous wells have been drilled on
the property. 115
The current surface owners filed a petition to annul the 1939 tax deed
stating that notice was not properly given to the Loftus heirs and that the
property description in the deed did not properly describe the property so
much so that identifying the land was impossible. 116 The trial court found
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 184–86.
Id. at 187.
Webb v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 194 So. 3d 41.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 44.
Id.
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that the property descriptions were sufficient enough to place the interested
parties on notice. 117
The appellate court stated that a tax sale is void when the tax deed does
not identify the property. 118 The plaintiffs argued that the language “less
three acres in the SW corner” made the property unidentifiable since the
shape of the reserved acreage could not be determined by the description. 119
The court found that the property description described the specific quarters
and sections of the land and did not attempt to convey acreage in corners of
the larger tracts. 120 As such, the court found that the description contained
in the assessment was reasonable enough so that the land could be
identified and affirmed the district court’s judgment. 121
III. Legislative Activity
A. Orphaned Wells
Acts 2016, No. 342 amends Louisiana Revised Statute 30:91(B)(1) with
regard to notice of a decision to declare an oilfield site orphaned and
enacted R.S. 30:28(J). 122 R.S. 30:28(J) requires the Commissioner of
Conservation to give notice to the surface owner of a piece of property on
which a well is located when an amended permit is issued to transfer
ownership of a well from one operator to another within thirty days of
issuing that permit. 123 The “Surface Owner” is defined as the person that is
currently on the tax assessor’s roll. 124
Before R.S. 30:91(B)(1) was amended, the law only required the
Assistant Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources to notify the
last operator of record and publish a notice in the Louisiana Register when
an oilfield site was determined to be orphaned. 125 As amended by Senate
Bill No. 165, the assistant secretary must continue to notify the last operator
of record, publish notice in the Louisiana Register, and also notify the
current surface owner. 126 The surface owner will be found by the name on

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
2016 La. Acts 342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the tax assessor’s roll. If the assistant secretary fails to notify the surface
owners, then the decision to declare a site orphaned will be invalidated. 127
Acts 2016, No. 583, which began as Senate Bill No. 428, enacts
Louisiana Revised Statute 30:88.1, which provides for the use of funds
coming from orphans wells for oilfield site restoration. 128 R.S. 30:88.1
defines an orphan well as an oil and gas well that is part of an oilfield site
determined as being orphaned as of August 1, 2016 and thereafter, and has
no production for longer than two years. 129 A portion of the money derived
from tax on the oil, gas, and condensate from an orphan well shall be given
to a site-specific trust, which once fully funded shall be given to the state
secretary. 130 If there is new production from orphaned wells, then another
account will be established to provide a source of funds for restoration of
the oilfield site. 131 An assessment by an approved assessment contractor
will be made to determine the site restoration requirements and costs. 132
B. Financial Security
Acts 2016, No. 634, which began as House Bill 632, provides for the
amount of financial security required by drilling permit applicants. 133 R.S.
30:4 requires a party requesting or amending a drilling permit to provide
financial security to the Commissioner of the Office of Conservation. 134
The amount of financial security for an individual well that is three
thousand feet or less is two dollars per foot. 135 Otherwise, the amount of
financial security will be in accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act. 136 There is no financial security required for wells declared to be
orphaned, which are subsequently transferred to another operator or wells
that have an agreement to be plugged or have been declared orphaned by
the commissioner. 137
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C. Imprescriptible Servitudes
Acts 2016, No. 60 amends R.S. 31:149(B) dealing with mineral rights
reserved by people in land acquired by governments or agencies. 138 R.S.
31:149(B) stated that land acquired by a governmental agency through “act
of sale, exchange, donation, or other contract, or by condemnation, or
expropriation” with a mineral reservation subject to the prescription of
nonuse, that mineral right is not subject to the prescription as long as the
land remains with the government or an agency thereof. 139 The instrument
by which the government acquires the land must reflect the intent to reserve
the mineral right and their imprescriptibility. 140 House Bill No. 634 adds
“appropriation” as to the ways the government entity can obtain the land. 141
D. Mail Solicitation Act
Acts 2016, No. 179 is a newly created law that regulates the solicitation
of offers for mineral rights through the mail. 142 This act, however, does not
apply if there was a “meaningful exchange” between the purchaser and the
seller. 143 In the event that there is a sale by mail solicitation, the act requires
that the transferring document state that it is a sale of mineral rights by
solicitation through the caption. 144 If the document contains the disclosure,
then the seller of the mineral rights can rescind the agreement after sixty
days on the date the document is signed. 145 If the document does not
contain the disclosure required by the act, then the purchaser can rescind
after three years from the signature date. 146 Further, the purchaser will be
liable for attorney and court costs if the disclosure is not noted on the
instrument. 147 If the option to rescind is exercised, the seller must return any
royalties and other payments received within sixty days of the rescission. 148
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